Weiskel: “We remember the identification Longinus proposed: “For, as if instinctively, our soul is uplifted by the true sublime; it takes a proud flight, and is filled with joy and vaunting, as though it had itself produced what it has heard” (Peri Hypsous, 7.2). The prior text is introjected; its power becomes our own. The joy and pride we feel are not simply adopted from the text, which may not concern such emotions, but are the affective prerogative of a crucial supererogation – the measure of the extent to which the identification releases power within greater than the power from without. Evidently the prior text presents, in its quality of excess, a potential threat or danger, an upsetting excitation which we can neutralize because we perceive it to be imaginary” (97-98, italics mine).

Weiskel's near epiphanic critique may be divided into three approximate sections: first, upon his departure from Longinus's quote, his initial refuge is Freudian, and to an extent, Kantian, as can be expected; he argues the subreptive, or the introjective, where the subject represses His schwäche through an unconscious inheritance of an acceptable/commandeering source of permanent power. While introjection amounts to an augmentation of strength internalized under duress, its ownership, or its sense of possession, cannot be transferred mechanically. Thus (and this is its second condition), a conscious detachment is brought to function – its purpose being to identify any textual (in this case preceding) source of the status quo power and estrange it, under any circumstances, from any trace of its previous sources, even at the cost of inflicting psychological schaden, whenever necessary. Why, it might be
asked, is that 'excess in estrangement' necessary, apart from repressing its forefatherly instincts to an acceptable limit? The answer is, I surmise, as an answer to the third section, that only that excess, or a universal fraction of overwhelming might initiate the Sublime; supererogation, being crucial, functions by repressing the text completely, and its potential for the textual sublime, through unbelievable violence, removing every trace (trance?) of logical estrangement, or in worse circumstances, of any estrangement having happened at all – a textual genocide, succumbing to cosmic annexation, committed via the introjective tool, weaponising the individual consciousness lethally. What then, is the methodology Longinus applies in order to achieve this objective?

The simpler answer, in this context, can be divulged in the explication of the 'rhetorical sublime', as theorized by Melissa Ianetta in her essay. However, Longinus's own approach to the question is ambivalent, and finally, insufficient, if that qualifies for his purposes – arousing the Sublime. In section XX of 'On the Sublime', he projects an uncomfortable aggregation, if not congestion of figures which would lead to Sublime evocation:

A powerful effect usually attends the union of figures for a common object, when two or three mingle together as it were in partnership, and contribute a fund of strength, persuasiveness, beauty. Thus, in the speech against Meidias, examples will be found of asyndeton, interwoven with instances of anaphora and diatyposis. (Rhys Roberts ed., 101)

The object must be common, and its supererogation vis-à-vis unity of rhetorical figures, marks its powerful effect. Notice that effect is in the singular; the plurality of figures must be adequately repressed in the impression created, and projected subsequently at the spectator. Even more so, the unfamiliar, if not uncanny purposiveness of a partnership, generates an absolute, not relative affect pertaining to obscurity – what Weiskel had earlier referred to as the "affective prerogative". This absolute annexation of obscurity, facilitated by the conglomeration of rhetorical figures, overpowering semantic logic/limits, to a spitze of no return by affective annihilation of reason on a cosmic scale before necessitating introjection, defines the logic of terror in the Longinian Sublime – something that one sublime figure, apparently, could never accomplish by itself – a reality agreed upon by I.A. Richards in The Philosophy of Rhetoric (OUP, 1965). The textual genocide, I re-argue, in Longinus, is the totalitarian conquest of sublimity, with a difference – does Coleridge fulfil the introjective section of the Longinian sublime in his Poem?

Coleridge's answer, it would seem, is zeimlich positive; in a notebook entry dated November, 1799, he transposes natural serrations into rhetorical serrations, and its aggregate, or the conglomeration, if not the influx of which would play an active, although unconscious role in the making of his Sublime poetry. The example cited serves as a reminder of how the supererogatory rhetoric is manhandled by the Poet upon its introjection of the excess in nature – a relocation of the objective into the subjective. This action would be replicated in the Rime carefully, where the narrator attempts a moderate degree of rhetorical piling:

The Sun came up upon the left,
Out of the Sea came he,
And he shone bright, and on the right,
Went down into the Sea. (Halmi et. al., 62, ll. 29-32)

Apart from the neat hyperbaton in the second line, the anaphoric usage of “came”,
“Sea”, “he”, the pseudo-anaphoric effect at work between “up” and “upon”, followed by the mocking polysyndeton while disguising the compound sentences through its balladic structure, understating its potential for diatyposis, creates the necessary ambience for the Longinian sublime in Coleridge. An antithetical pull, indicated by shining and drowning, left and right, and the masculine “Sun” contrasted with the feminine “Sea”, also prophecies its transition into other forms of the Sublime, although its replication is still far from over:

In mist or cloud on mast or shroud,
It perched for vespers nine,
Whilst all the night thro' fog-smoke white
Glimmer'd the white moon-shine. (73-76)

Here, diatyposis, in its original sense of detailed description, exists in full perception of the readers; the mocking asyndeton is dropped towards the end of section one, and the wild anaphoric impulse is controlled, if not repressed, restricting it to one or two instances. To answer our question then: the limit, or the logic of terror in the Longinian sublime persists in the fear of rhetorical annexation via introjection, transforming natural serrations into subjective/textual serrations, thereby recreating cosmic conquest of the earthly through an annihilation of reason by the supersensible. This is short lived, as the antithetical pull of the Sublime becomes more prominent in the second section, and the influx deconstructs into the Burkean Sublime, as we shall observe in the second section of the essay.

II

Weiskel: “There is, first, Burke's division of the passions into the erotic and the self-preservation – a dichotomous scheme precisely parallel to the division between the sexual instincts and the ego-instincts in the middle Freud. In the late Freud, as is commonly known, this dualism was extended into a metapsychological opposition between eros and the death instinct, later named thanatos. Like Freud, Burke was an insistent dualist in his claim that pain cannot be reduced to the absence of pleasure” (92, italics in original)

The argument that Weiskel poses here is readily deducible – Burke, as a dualist, or as a pre-Freudian theoretician of the process of sublimation can be construed. This dichotomy between the Erotic and the Thanatic, broadly speaking, if interpreted along the lines of infinite regression into discourse, could become a causative aspect for terror. In other words, perennial metapsychological terror might be propagated when the dichotomy between similarity and difference – or worse still – between difference and difference – could be forced to annihilate the finite/logical/limited threshold, by weaponising both inadequacy and an overwhelming of the aesthetic category. As Weiskel himself contends, in Burke, the pain of terror can pulverize (counteract but in a dialectical setup) the negative pleasure of terror infinitely. Alternatively, one could also, as a compensatory act, argue, that the terror generated from the antithesis invented between supererogatory pleasures which dialectizes just pleasure might be infinitely perpetuated, without damaging the argument's integrity. This phenomenon could be instantiated with an example: consider Burke's explanation, in *A Philosophical Inquiry*, on why darkness is terrible:

I believe any one will find if he opens his eyes and makes an effort to see in a dark place, that a very perceivable pain ensues. And I have heard some ladies remark, that after having worked a long time upon a ground of black, their eyes were pained and weakened that
they could hardly see. (Phillips ed., 133)

The conflict, albeit perceptuo-psychological, involves the resistance of darkness against what could be called, keeping in mind the context, the heresy of vision. Darkness, as Burke would like it, wants to self-preserve its own mode of pleasure – here blindness; pain ensues when vision attempts a violation of that sacred space, and whatever vision is made possible despite the immense pain of making darkness visible could only be interpreted, in retrospect, as negative pleasure, emanating from the negligible progress in an impossible pursuit. Here a dialectic, forced into action by an aggregate of un-common subjects (curiously, a space introjected by the Burkean “I” which absorbs them unconsciously), with the objective of creating a discursive polarity within an absolute ontological space, is akin to the Sublime, since the terror of darkness engulfing whatever optimal progress is made remains immanent. The hyperbolic labour of creating an antithesis, coupled with the sustenance of such antithesis infinitely by, recreates the Burkean Sublime. This is its logic, or the limit of its terror. As Burke confesses in a succeeding section, that

Though the effects of black be painful originally, we must not think they always continue so. Custom reconciles us to everything. After we have been used to the sight of black objects, the terror abates, and the smoothness and glossiness or some agreeable accident of bodies so coloured, softens in some measure the horror and sternness of their original nature; yet the nature of the original impression still continues. (ibid. 135)

The dialectizing in Burke – the dualism evinced by Weiskel in his dialogue can, with ease, be divided into its original source and final destination; thus, original pain might gravitate against final painlessness, if not final pleasure. Either way, the perpetuation of this antithesis may be transplanted upon thought too – the dilution of thought might qualify as dialectizing fundamental thought or, as a fallow example in comparison, fundamental emotion might take its place. Burke's central argument to the evocation of the Sublime states that one must be habituated ("custom") to the dialectizing of the Universe in order to respond to its subtleties. The abating of "terror", in close resemblance with Weiskel's central argument, conveys that adequate dialectic serration/striation accustoms the individual to recognize variations as psychological antithesis, and draw pleasure, if necessary, from the reduction of pain rather than its eradication. The ability to universalize such psychological variations by acknowledging the limitations of synthesis, theorizing supererogatory a-synthesis upon requirement, forms the crux of the Burkean sublime. To what extent is this antithetical infinity, or infinite antithesis replicated in Coleridge's *Rime*?

Although Coleridge is known to have treated Burke's treatise on the Sublime as a product of his juvenilia, his response to the antithetical was mechanically positive, as can be witnessed in this document authored in November 1803, now preserved in the British Library. In Part II of the *Rime*, the logic of antithesis is flexed to the maximum degree possible, observed upon shooting the albatross:

The breezes blew, the white foam flew,
The furrow follow'd free:
We were the first that ever burst
Into the silent Sea.
Down dropt the breeze, the Sails dropt down,
'Twas sad as sad could be
And we did speak only to break
The silence of the Sea.

All in a hot and copper sky
The bloody sun at noon,
Right up above the mast did stand
No bigger than the moon. (66, ll. 99-110)

Apart from being accompanied by the heavy alliteration and a moderate amount of the Longinian rhetoric, “We” foreshadows” the “I” who would be the only survivor in this wreckage, while the Lärm, emanating from the “burst”, is contrasted with the silence of the sea. Infinity is escorted by the “ever” preceding “burst”, while the triplicated alliteration in the second line of the first stanza symbolizes the perpetuation of rhetoric. In the second stanza, the repetition of the burst/silence formula in the speak/silence opposition is redundant, but universal sadness (“as sad as sad could be”) is written in perfect memory of (and in conscious antithesis to) the perpetual joy upon perceiving the albatross in the first section. The action of breaking, here similar to the Burkean effort at making visible the terror of Universal darkness, is an attempt at rationalizing the apocalyptic, but also an action that sets the maximum level of transgression in a totalitarian diktat. Breaking reads more along the lines of unmaking as well as creating a bi-polarity, so that a dialectic might be forced to exist. In the final stanza, the Universal “All” sources everything; aberrations of size become surreal (Sun/No bigger than the moon), the Rightness of direction is a stark reminder of the wrongness of the crew, forcing the transferred epithet (“bloody sun”) to dehumanize them in an inconsiderate manner. The supererogatory nature of hotness (“hot and copper sky”, “bloody sun at noon”, “Right up above”) intensifies celestial standing as the bloodless sailors are about to recline and die. Even, the smooth balladic rhyme scheme is antithetical to the infinite roughness that the sailors are confronted with – a classic mimicry of Burkean dualism. Thus, the logic, or limit of terror, in both Burke and Coleridge, is the terror of infinite antithesis, as we have evinced in our discourse.

III

Weiskel: The fantasy of injury ends in the simultaneous perception of defeat and the realization that the threat is not, after all, a real one. This makes possible a positive resolution of the anxiety in the delight of the third phase, which is psychologically an identification with the superior power. As a defence mechanism, identification is simply a more sophisticated form of introjection or incorporation (the three terms are often used interchangeably). The boy must have introjected or internalized an image of the superior power in order to picture to himself the consequences of aggression, and in the reactive defense this introjected image is reinforced as the affects line up on its side. The identification which thus establishes the superego retains an essential ambiguity. The boy neutralizes the possibility of danger by incorporating or swallowing it: it is now within and can't hurt him from without. But he must also renounce the aggression and turn himself into – be swallowed by – the image, now an ideal which is greater than the psyche – beyond it and at the same time within – may be met on every page of Kant’s
account. (93, italics mostly mine, except two, at the end)

I am interested in the acquiring of what Weiskel calls “superior power” – this superiority originates in the relatively schwach individual who amasses power by internalizing any objective representation of it. The logic at work is introjection, but the terror lies in his arsenal of barely disguised subjective strength, sourced in the repression and subsequent absorption as well as channelization, or sublimation of objective might. The aesthetic of the Sublime, although vested in non-injury or harmlessness physically, is, by every other means, a psycho-spiritual exploitation on the impressionable boy – a phenomenon admixed with genuine noumenal threat. This Kantian action begins by being defensive, since annihilation ought to be weighed as a pre-consumptive ingredient, which, as per the nature of its ingestion, becomes accordingly reactive. Despite this psycho-spiritual transformation, an ambiguity remains as the ideological takes shape (here one word for both true and false consciousness), but the threat, in an aesthetic domain, has been forced to relinquish its impact. Why must this superior power be moral? As Immanuel Kant elaborates in the Analytic of the Sublime,

It follows that the intellectual and intrinsically final (moral) good, estimated aesthetically, instead of being represented as beautiful, must rather be represented as Sublime, with the result that it arouses more a feeling of respect (which disdains charm) than of love or of its heart being drawn towards it – for human nature does not by its own proper motion accord with the good, but only by virtue of the dominion which reason exercises over sensibility. Conversely, that too, which we call sublime in external nature is only represented as a might of the mind enabling it to overcome this or that hindrance of sensibility by means of moral principles, and it is from this that it derives its interest. (CJ, 124)

Why? Because – first, respect, reverence or admiration (Kant uses all three variations elsewhere in the Critique), supersedes love, pleasure or desire; the pain of intellectual absolution is negative pleasure – even pain, at its pinnacle – superiority being established in the dialectic intersection of the highest intellect with its highest human equivalent – “a feeling of respect”, as Kant himself puts it. Secondly, the dominion of reason over sensibility, being a super-conscious accomplishment, results in a repression of beauty, the flipside of the Sublime, which also results in the unconscious ammunition of the non-mind to not simply get regulated, but allowed inferiorization by the creative might of the conscious mind. This, once again, poses a pertinent problem – can we, or can we not connote this “dominion” as not nur the acknowledgment of moral superiority, but of moral imperialism, since the implied categorical imperative of the sublime mind resembles imperial conquest of the intellect?

Coleridge's reverence towards Kantian philosophical objectives is a well-charted territory. This could be amplified by the Kantianism of his letters, where he pleads for the superiority of reason over sensibility in an aesthetic domain, a phenomenon repeated with meagre modifications in his Table Talk. In Part IV of the Rime, the mariner is forced to repent the misjudgement of his actions under the influence of sensibility, now punishable as moral transgression of the divine order:

Alone, alone, all, all alone,
Alone on a wide wide sea!
And never a saint took pity on
My soul in agony. (75, ll. 233-36, 1834 version)
The Universal impasse between the sensible, and the supersensible faculty is final; if one overlooks the emphasis on rhetoric for a minute, the infinite nature of contradiction (“never”) due to the distinct absence of a viable superego (echoing Weiskel) calls for the external intervention of an enlightened being (“a saint”) whose soul may be introjected, or internalized by the poet-figure (provided he is in a position to sympathize/forgive him, initiating repression of sensibility and consequent sublimation of instincts), both with the objective of redemption from the sinful execution of sensibility, followed by the establishment of an absolute intellect that shall arrest further participation in such action. The word “agony” may be read classically, symbolizing the struggle of manifesting the divine via suppression of the demoniacal within the same character. As a stand alone stanza, it would not be a mistake to argue that sensibility and intelligibility are so far apart that “all the evidences of moral value are mutually contradictory” (621), as Frances Ferguson puts it. Mutual contradiction thaws as the spell begins to break upon the vision of the water-snakes:

O happy living things! No tongue
Their beauty might declare:
A spring of love gusht from my heart,
And I bless'd them unaware!
Sure my kind saint took pity on me,
And I blessed them unaware. (274-79)

It is the appreciation of the “beauty” of water-snakes that makes the sailor re-discover, if not re-examine his sublime; the litotic structure in the first line, coupled with its exclamatory beginning, allows the author to make a case for its objective universal validity, which is an introjection of Kant's critique. Being the donor of “a spring of love” from his heart, he consciously participates in their beauty, but determined to isolate himself in his search for intellectual finality (giving love does not elicit mutual love, but compensatory respect), he blesses them – indicating the unconscious activation of negative pleasure that immediately attempts the subservience of the beautiful. An implicit itinerary from “my heart” to “my brain” is auto-initiated alongside his secret declaration of the subjective universal validity, as “never a saint” transitions into “my kind saint” via introjection, the defence mechanism transforming into the reactive phase—the creation of the Coleridgean sublime is complete. Moral superiority, however, does not remain confined with the individual (as it might seem from this), as he weaponizes it to amplify his spell on the wedding-guest, universalizing it undemocratically in Part VII of the *Rime*:

He prayeth well who loveth well
Both man and bird and beast.

He prayeth best who loveth best,
All things both great and small:
For the dear God, who loveth us,
He made and loveth all. (98, ll. 645-650)

The suzerainty upon the landscape is no longer subjective as the narrator takes possession of moral covenants in the divine and human realms, while subserving both the
lesser, (un-sublime, morally inferior) man and the a-moral animal kingdom (“bird and beast”). This ability to love is indispensable for the sublime individual to elicit respect since, as Gayle S. Smith rightly asserts, that “Coleridge…views man as too limited – or too dynamic – a creature to grasp and keep any one moral vision, while continuing to function in “the world in which we live”” (51). Imperialism is complete once the reader might comprehend that “the dear God, who loveth us” is none other than the sailor – he is the Providential figure now, as the divine and the human are incorporated into each other at the end of the poem. To conclude, the logic, or the limits of terror in Kantian Coleridge is the subtle transference of the Sublime discourse from moral superiority to moral imperialism, transcendence having become irrevocable, resonating Weiskel’s argument.

ENDNOTES

1“We do not sufficiently understand the story to analyze it. It is a Dutch attempt at German Sublimity. Genius has here been employed in producing a poem of little merit” (53). See Samuel Taylor Coleridge: The Critical Heritage (Vol. 1, 1794-1834), edited by J.R. De J. Jackson for Routledge, 1968.

Netland’s essay, titled “Reading and Resistance: The Hermeneutic Subtext of The Rime of the Ancient Mariner”, and originally published in Christianity and Literature, Vol. 43, No. 1, 1993, 37-58, has been excerpted by Harold Bloom for the Bloom’s Major Poets Series on Samuel T. Coleridge (Infobase Publishing, 2001). It [the poem, Netland argues] “contains a tension between contrasting religious imaginations – between the mystical, symbolic, irrational power of the religious sublime on the one hand and a categorical, enlightened, and rational systematization of religious experience on the other” (30).


3“I have been leading up – or down, if you like – to an extremely simple and obvious but fundamental remark: that no word can be judged as to whether it is good or bad, correct or incorrect, beautiful or ugly, or anything else that matters to a writer, in isolation” (51).

4Echoing the aspect involving the unity of figures, Raimonda Modiano, in Coleridge and the Concept of Nature (Palgrave Macmillan, 1985), would define the Coleridgean sublime as follows: “Unity of an indeterminate character, which cannot be localized in physical forms, yet is hazily apprehended through them, is the foremost quality of Coleridge's sublime object, to which all others are subordinated” (115). Her use of “apprehended” instead of comprehended, “physical forms” instead of the ideological, and “sublime object” instead of the sublime subject both differs and defers from the Kantianism of the Coleridgean unconscious.

5“Before the great fall there are six falls, each higher than the other, the chasm still gradually deepening, till the great fall, of which the Height[h] & Depth is sudden & out of all comparison (sic)” (39). See Coleridge's Writings (Vol. 5), edited by David Vailins for Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

6It is proximate to the definition of the Sublime proposed by Christopher Braider in “Unlearning the Sublime”: “The Sublime is accordingly what comes back, a ghostly revenant whose spectral persistence negates the historical time of intermittence, chance and change even it claims history as its source” (19). Braider's essay was published in a special issue on 'The Sublime and Education', edited by J. Jennifer Jones for Romantic Circles: https://romantic-
Mountains cast larger shadows, & must needs therefore produce grander effects of Light & Shade/ & the absolute change of visual Objects produced thereby – I do not see the same things in the Noon that I did in the Morning - /(Add to this) this ever varying Distances of the distant Objects to you, & to each other” (Vallins ed., 71). The implicit opposites (larger/smaller, absolute/temporary, Object/Subject), coupled with the explicit opposites (Light/Shade, Morning/Noon, each/Other), attest to Coleridge's mature understanding of the dialectical Sublime in the manner of Burke. Add to this his crypto-assertion of the dialectic (trialectic?) potential of the Subjective “I”, the Paranomasiac “I”, and the Divine “I” in the making of the Sublime.

“If the Greek writer [Plato] 'dazzled' Coleridge with his imagery and philosophical mythology, the German [Kant] 'took possession of me as with a giant's hand' owing to his rigour of thought, his ‘adamantine chain of logie’” (35). See James Vigus's Platonic Coleridge, published by Modern Humanities Research Association and Routledge in 2009.

“I lay in a state of almost prophetic Trance & Delight - & blessed God aloud, for the powers of Reason & the Will, which remaining no Danger can overpower us! O God, I exclaimed aloud – how calm, how blessed am I now…/When the Reason & the Will are away, what remains to us but Darkness & Dimness & bewildering Shame, and Pain that is utterly Lord over us, or fantastic Pleasure, that draws the Soul along swimming through the air in many shapes, even as a Flight of Starlings in a Wind” (CL, 2, Vallins ed., 50).

“A Fall of some sort or other – the creation, as it were, of the non-absolute – is the fundamental postulate of the moral history of Man. Without this hypothesis, Man is unintelligible; with it every phenomenon is explicable. The mystery is too profound for human insight” (396). While this is a Biblical replication of the original sin, the fundamental concept remains the same – the fall resulting from supererogatory sensibility without due regard for intelligibility, or morality. “Every phenomenon” becomes a noumena with rational superiority, in a manner of speaking, triggering the supra-human which dominates by transforming the sensible faculty. See “A Poem of Pure Imagination (Reconsiderations VI”, authored by Robert Penn Warren for The Kenyon Review (Vol. 8, No. 3, 1946, pp. 391-427). https://www.jstor.org/stable/433277.

Albert O’ Wlecke’s commentary on the Coleridgean Sublime is appropriate in this context: “Sublime consciousness for Coleridge reveals itself to be…sublime self-consciousness, and those ideas he designates as sublime are in fact ideas that throw the mind back toward an awareness of its own indefinite activity” (146). The “unaware” blessing of the sailor is a retrogressive act of the unconscious, triggering the ideological alongside the subjective self-conscious (“my kind saint”). See Coleridge and the Psychology of Romanticism: Feeling and Thought, authored by David Vallins (Macmillan Press, 2000).

Works Cited


